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FOREWORD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN
J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO
Allan Ides*
It is emphatically the duty of the U.S. Supreme Court to say what
the law is. The constitutional law of personal jurisdiction is entirely
judge-made and, therefore, Court decisions have serious consequences
for those who seek redress for their injuries. In the October 2010 term,
when the Court granted certiorari in the products-liability case
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, it was poised to ameliorate a
state of confusion surrounding the personal jurisdiction “stream-ofcommerce” doctrine. Since 1987, lower courts, litigants, and scholars
have struggled to apply the conflicting personal jurisdiction standards
that the Court announced in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v Superior
Court. Some courts have applied the “pure” stream-of-commerce
standard that Justice Brennan championed in Asahi, while others have
required litigants to meet Justice O’Connor’s more stringent “plus”
stream-of-commerce model.
This Foreword explains how those who look to the J. McIntyre
opinion to clarify the law of personal jurisdiction in products liability
cases—and to fulfill the Court’s responsibility to attend well to
constitutional doctrines—will be sorely disappointed. First, this
Foreword criticizes Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion for its flawed
interpretation of precedent, for its conclusory legal analysis, and for
failing to clarify the doctrinal standards. Then, this Foreword laments
how Justice Breyer’s concurrence manipulates the facts of the case to
fit his fabrication of the applicable doctrine. Finally, this Foreword
shows how Justice Ginsburg’s dissent focuses on the narrative while it
fails to address the central question in J. McIntyre; thus, it plays an
active role in the Court’s giant leap backward. With each opinion so

* Christopher N. May Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. Many thanks to
Chris May, who read and commented on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also to Elena
DeCoste Grieco for her careful and precise editing.
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lacking in care and judgment, lower courts will continue to muddle
through the questions left open in Asahi, questions now burdened with
the unhelpful J. McIntyre overlay. In the judiciary’s role to say what the
law is, the U.S. Supreme Court in J. McIntyre let us all down.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”1 From this firmly established
proposition, it follows that the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations
of the Constitution are the supreme law of the land.2 The
consequences of that principle are particularly profound when the
Constitution’s text speaks in sweeping terms, as does the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for such broadly
worded texts invite a level and form of judicial activity that
inseparably blends the roles of lawmaker and law interpreter. The
constitutional law of personal jurisdiction presents a case in point,
because 100 percent of that law is judge-made and therefore subject
to the Supreme Court’s unchecked authority.
The Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations matter. They
not only determine the winners and losers in the cases to which they
apply but they also channel government policy into currents that flow
from Court-established doctrine. The decisions often touch on issues
that enflame public debate and may even go so far as to select the
next President of the United States.3 And while the constitutional law
of personal jurisdiction may not be headline-grabbing—at least not
for all of us—the doctrine developed under that rubric has serious
consequences for those seeking redress for injuries suffered and for
everyone participating in our market-driven economy as a producer,
seller, or consumer of goods. It is, therefore, fitting to demand that
the High Court, as the unchecked maker of the constitutional law of
personal jurisdiction, attend well to the doctrines that it fabricates,
for as our friendly neighborhood Spider-Man reminds us, “With
great power comes great responsibility.”4
This Foreword focuses on a particular decision by the Supreme
Court during its October 2010 term: J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro.5 At issue in that case was whether New Jersey courts could
exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer of
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures 2002). Yes, I know, Spidey’s Uncle Ben says it first.
131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).

Winter 2012]

FOREWORD

345

industrial machines, one of whose machines was sold in New Jersey,
where it allegedly injured an employee who was using it in the
normal course of business.6 The jurisdictional issue revolved around
the “stream-of-commerce” doctrine.7 U.S. courts have used that
doctrine for several decades as a basis for justifying the exercise of
personal jurisdiction in products liability suits brought against out-ofstate manufacturers whose products are sold in the forum state and
cause injury there.8 The law in this critical area, however, has been in
a state of confusion for many years. In 2010, the Supreme Court
stepped in and granted certiorari in J. McIntyre, ostensibly to
ameliorate that confusion.
The Court heard oral argument in J. McIntyre on January 11,
2011, and announced its judgment 167 days later, on the closing day
of the term.9 The relatively lengthy delay between argument and
decision was a sign that the Court had struggled with the decision.
The sign was correct. The J. McIntyre Court issued no majority
opinion, and the three opinions that it did issue (a plurality, a
concurrence, and a dissent)10 exacerbated rather than ameliorated the
doctrinal confusion. Moreover, each of the opinions, to varying
degrees, demonstrated a disappointing level of judicial competence
well below that which we can rightfully expect from Supreme Court
Justices. I will save the details of my critique for later. At this point,
suffice it to say that the separate opinions showed an individual and a
collective lack of judgment, as well as a troubling willingness to
dispose of an important case in a haphazard and indeterminate
fashion. We should expect and demand much more from these
exalted, life-tenured jurists.
Part II of this Foreword describes the facts of the case. Part III
provides a brief survey of the relevant doctrinal landscape, focusing
particularly on the status of the stream-of-commerce doctrine as it
stood prior to the grant of certiorari in J. McIntyre. Part IV
summarizes the decisions of the lower courts in this case. Part V
examines and criticizes the J. McIntyre plurality, concurring, and

6. Id. at 2786.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
9. 131 S. Ct. at 2780.
10. Id. at 2785 (plurality opinion); id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2794 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
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dissenting opinions for their lack of craftsmanship, integrity, and
judgment. Part VI offers a few concluding remarks regarding the
minimal standards of professionalism that ought to guide the
Supreme Court and shape every opinion that a Supreme Court Justice
issues.
II. THE FACTUAL
NARRATIVE
On October 11, 2001, Robert Nicastro (“Nicastro”), a long-time
employee at Curcio Scrap Metal in Saddle Brook, New Jersey, was
operating a three-ton metal-shearing machine, a McIntyre Model 640
Shear.11 His right hand became lodged in the machine and the blade
severed four fingers off that hand.12 He sued the foreign
manufacturer and its U.S. distributor in a New Jersey superior court
on a theory of products liability.13 The manufacturer filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.14 The distributor declared
bankruptcy and did not participate in the lawsuit.15
The manufacturer of the machine, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.
(“McIntyre UK”), was a British company with its principal place of
business in Nottingham, England.16 It manufactured heavy industrial
machinery used in scrap metal recycling and, during the relevant
time frame, sold its products throughout the world, including in the
United States. From at least 1994 through 2001, McIntyre Machinery
America, Ltd. (“McIntyre America”), an Ohio corporation with its
principal place of business in Ohio, served as the exclusive
distributor and agent for McIntyre UK products sold in the United
States.17 McIntyre America was not a subsidiary of McIntyre UK,
and neither company participated in the ownership or management of
the other.18
11. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd. (Nicastro I), 945 A.2d 92, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
12. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd. (Nicastro II), 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010),
rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
13. Id. at 577–78.
14. Id. at 578.
15. Id. at 578 n.2.
16. Id. at 579.
17. Id. at 577–78, 592.
18. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d 92, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J.
2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
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In 1994 or 1995, Frank Curcio (“Curcio”), the owner of Curcio
Scrap Metal, attended the annual Institute of Scrap Metal
Industries (ISRI) convention in Las Vegas, Nevada.19 The ISRI
convention, which is held annually in a U.S. city, is “the world’s
largest scrap recycling industry trade show.”20 It attracts “owners
[and] managers of scrap processing companies” and others
“interested in seeing—and purchasing—new equipment.”21
Representatives of McIntyre UK attended each of the annual ISRI
conventions between 1990 and 2005,22 and McIntyre UK and
McIntyre America operated a jointly sponsored booth at the ISRI Las
Vegas conventions held in 1994 and 1995, at which they displayed
and sold McIntyre UK’s machines, including the Model 640 Shear.23
While at the ISRI convention, Curcio visited the McIntyre booth
and learned about the Model 640 Shear.24 Upon his return home, his
company ordered a Model 640 Shear from McIntyre America at a
price of $24,900.25 The machine was constructed in England and
shipped from there by McIntyre UK to McIntyre America in Ohio,
which then delivered the machine to Curcio Scrap Metal in New
Jersey.26 There was no evidence that McIntyre UK knew that the
machine was destined for New Jersey when it shipped the Model 640
Shear to Ohio.27 The invoice indicated that Curcio had purchased the
machine from McIntyre America, but a metal plate on the machine
and the accompanying documentation, both of which included
McIntyre UK’s address and telephone number, indicated that
McIntyre UK in England had manufactured the machine.28 Given

19. Joint Appendix at 78a, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011)
(No. 09-1343).
20. Id. at 47a.
21. Id. at 48a–49a.
22. Id. at 114a–115a.
23. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d at 96.
24. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 78a–79a.
25. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d at 96.
26. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 78a–79a.
27. Id. at 117a. During discovery, McIntyre UK was unable to locate any of the purchase
orders it had received from McIntyre America. The UK company admitted, however, that
“additional documents may exist . . . but they would be contained in the large volume of
[McIntyre UK’s] business records that were appropriated by the receiver appointed to oversee the
receivership of [McIntyre UK’s] former parent company.” Id. at 118a.
28. Nicastro II, 987 A.2d 575, 578 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
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this information, Curcio concluded that if he needed any repairs or
parts, he would contact McIntyre UK.29
It is possible that other McIntyre UK products were sold in New
Jersey, but the record clearly establishes only the one sale to
Curcio.30 With respect to sales throughout the United States,
McIntyre UK claimed to have no access to the records, but in 2002 a
McIntyre UK spokesperson described McIntyre UK’s shears as being
well-established in the United States.31 In addition, in answers to
interrogatories, McIntyre UK stated that its commissioning engineer
had installed McIntyre UK products in Virginia, Illinois,
Washington, Iowa, and Kentucky.32 Answers to other interrogatories
indicated that McIntyre UK had been sued in Illinois, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, and West Virginia.33
Between 1990 and 2005, representatives of McIntyre UK
attended twenty-six scrap metal marketing events held in the United
States, including each of the annual ISRI conventions.34 These events
were held in various U.S. cities, including Chicago, Las Vegas, New
Orleans, Orlando, San Antonio, San Diego, and San Francisco.35
McIntyre UK attended the events for the purpose of promoting the
sale of the company’s products to “anyone interested in the machine
from anywhere in the United States.”36 No area of the United States
was deemed off limits under this distribution scheme. Michael
Pownall, the president of McIntyre UK, attended the conventions
held in Las Vegas in 1994 and 1995, as well as several others held in
different U.S. cities.37
The distribution arrangement under which McIntyre UK and
McIntyre America operated is somewhat elusive. This is due, in part,
to the unavailability of critical business records, such as McIntyre

29. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 78a.
30. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d at 99.
31. Id. at 98 (quoting Brian Taylor, McIntyre Names North American Distributor,
RECYCLING TODAY, May 16, 2002, available at http://www.recyclingtoday.com/Article.aspx
?article_id=18315).
32. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 119a.
33. Id. at 108a; see, e.g., Whitaker v. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 2004 WL 1586989 (Ky. Ct.
App. July 16, 2004).
34. Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 114a–117a.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 161a.
37. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d 92, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J.
2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
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America purchase orders, as noted above. Correspondence and
e-mail exchanges between the companies do make it clear, however,
that McIntyre UK sought to exploit the entire U.S. market, that
McIntyre America took direction and guidance from McIntyre UK in
the advertising and sales of McIntyre UK products,38 that McIntyre
America was responsible for sales and distribution in the entire U.S.
market, and that the two companies jointly sponsored McIntyre
booths at ISRI conventions.39 As to the actual operation of the
distribution scheme, McIntyre UK claimed that the Model 640
Shears were made “to order,” i.e., only after McIntyre America had
completed a sale and submitted a purchase order to McIntyre UK.40
McIntyre UK further claimed that it sold the Model 640 Shear
directly to McIntyre America without knowledge of the ultimate
purchaser.41 But the record reveals a somewhat more fluid system
under which the “sale” to McIntyre America was not deemed
complete until McIntyre America remitted the ultimate purchaser’s
payment to McIntyre UK, less a “commission.”42 Moreover,
McIntyre UK retained the right to collect any unsold stock sitting in
the McIntyre America warehouse.43 Consistent with the foregoing,
McIntyre UK monitored the size of the McIntyre America inventory
and asserted a right to “collect” unsold merchandise sitting in
McIntyre America’s Ohio warehouse.44
In short, McIntyre UK manufactured a three-ton industrial
metal-processing machine known as the Model 640 Shear; McIntyre
UK actively promoted the sale of that machine and some of its other
products throughout the United States, both directly and through its
exclusive distributor, McIntyre America; McIntyre UK sought to
serve the entire U.S. market but made no special effort either to serve
or exclude the New Jersey market; as a direct consequence of
McIntyre UK’s national marketing effort, a New Jersey business—
Curcio Scrap Metal—ordered a Model 640 Shear from McIntyre
America, which had either previously obtained the machine from
McIntyre UK or submitted a purchase order for the machine based
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Joint Appendix, supra note 19, at 123a–124a.
Id. at 123a–128a.
Id. at 170a.
Id. at 171a.
Id. at 131a.
Id. at 135a.
Id.

350

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:341

on the potential sale to Curcio Scrap Metal; McIntyre America
delivered the Model 640 Shear to Curcio Scrap Metal in New Jersey,
where it was used in the regular course of business, which use led to
Nicastro’s injuries.45
III. THE DOCTRINAL
LANDSCAPE
Nicastro filed a products liability suit against McIntyre UK in a
New Jersey superior court claiming that the Model 640 Shear was
unreasonably dangerous.46 His wife joined him in the suit, alleging a
loss of consortium.47 After being served, McIntyre UK filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.48 Before examining the
state court proceedings on McIntyre UK’s motion49 it might be
helpful, especially for those who are not steeped in the lore of
procedure, to describe the doctrinal landscape as it stood when
McIntyre UK filed its motion.
The basics, at least, are easy and should be familiar to anyone
who has survived a first-year course in civil procedure. A state court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only
if that defendant is served while the defendant is physically present
in the state, consents to the exercise of jurisdiction, waives any
objection to the exercise of jurisdiction, or has established “minimum
contacts” with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction
under a state long-arm statute over her would not offend “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”50 As to the minimumcontacts test, the threshold requirement of this due process standard
is that the nonresident defendant must have engaged in conduct
purposefully directed at the forum state.51 From a due process
perspective, this purposeful affiliation with the forum provides the
45. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d 92, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J.
2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
46. Id. at 95. Nicastro also sued McIntyre America, but the latter declared bankruptcy and
did not participate in the litigation. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2796 n.2
(2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
47. Nicastro II, 987 A.2d 575, 578 n.1 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd.
v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
48. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d at 95.
49. See infra Part IV.
50. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
51. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–75 (1985).
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nonresident defendant fair warning that she may be sued in that state
on claims arising out of her volitional affiliation.52
In general, questions of purposeful direction or purposeful
availment tend to be of one of the following types: (1) activities
engaged in by the nonresident defendant or her agents in the forum
state; (2) contractual relations between the nonresident defendant and
a resident of the forum state; (3) the placement by the nonresident
defendant of a product into the stream of commerce with an eventual
retail sale of that product in the forum state; or (4) tortious activity
engaged in by the nonresident defendant outside of the forum state
that causes a foreseeable effect in the forum state. Each type requires
a “highly realistic”53 appraisal of the facts in light of the appropriate
legal standards, the goal being to determine whether the nonresident
defendant’s conduct can be properly characterized as purposefully
directed at the forum state and thereby provide her with fair warning
of a potential lawsuit in that state.54
Nicastro’s lawsuit against McIntyre UK implicated the streamof-commerce form of purposeful affiliation.55 The stream-ofcommerce test typically applies in products liability cases. The basic
outline is simple. A manufacturer located in one state (or foreign
country), say State A, sells or transfers its product to a second entity,
which then delivers the product into another state, say State B, where
the product is sold at retail and where it then causes an injury. The
stream starts in the state (or country) of manufacture—State A—and
ends in the state of retail sale—State B. The ultimate question in any
such case is whether, under the given facts, the manufacturer’s
placement of the product into the stream of commerce in State A
constitutes the manufacturer’s purposeful contact with State B, the
52. Id. at 474 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980)).
53. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479.
54. See generally ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 84–86, 90–91 (4th ed. 2012) (providing background on proper jurisdiction under the
applicable long-arm statute and the minimum-contacts test).
55. One could also have plausibly argued that McIntyre UK’s conduct fell into each of the
other three categories. Thus, if McIntyre America were deemed the agent for McIntyre UK, one
could argue that McIntyre America’s sale of the Model 640 Shear to Curcio Scrap Metal in New
Jersey was attributable to McIntyre UK. Similarly, the sales contract between McIntyre America
and Curcio Scrap Metal and any warranty of the Model 640 Shear by McIntyre UK might be seen
as contractual relations with a New Jersey resident. Finally, if the effects test were read broadly
(it generally is not), one could argue that that the design and manufacture of the Model 640 Shear
in England had a foreseeable, injurious effect in New Jersey.
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state of retail sale and injury. Stated somewhat differently, we want
to know whether our manufacturer purposefully availed itself of the
benefits and protections of State B’s laws.
The Supreme Court first endorsed the stream-of-commerce
theory in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson56 but held that the
standards of the theory were not satisfied under the facts presented
since the suit was not brought in the state of retail sale (New York)
but in a state to which the purchaser of the automobile in question
had later traveled (Oklahoma) after the retail sale had been
consummated.57 Given that the doctrine did not apply, the Court
provided no further guidance as to its scope or operation.
The Court next examined of the stream-of-commerce theory in
Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court.58 That case
involved a motorcycle accident that took place in California and was
alleged to have been caused by the failure of a defective tire tube or
by the valve on that tube. Asahi manufactured the valve in Japan,
then shipped it to Taiwan, where Cheng Shin bought the valve and
incorporated it into a Cheng Shin tire tube, which Cheng Shin then
shipped to California, where the plaintiff purchased the tube at retail.
The plaintiff sued several defendants in a California state court,
including Cheng Shin but not Asahi. Cheng Shin filed a cross-claim
against Asahi for indemnification. The case settled between the
plaintiff and the defendants, and all that remained before the state
courts was the cross-claim between Cheng Shin and Asahi.59 The
question before the Supreme Court was whether California courts
could exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi under these
circumstances. Eight members of the Court agreed that, regardless of
whether Asahi had purposeful contacts with California, it would be
unreasonable for the courts of California to exercise jurisdiction over
the Japanese company under the circumstances presented: a claim
between foreign parties on a question likely subject to foreign law
over which the state of California had no legitimate interest given
that the resident plaintiff’s claims had been settled.60

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id. at 297–98.
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
Id. at 105–08.
Id. at 113–16.
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While a strong majority of the Court agreed that the exercise of
jurisdiction over Asahi would be unreasonable, the Court could not
agree on the appropriate standards to apply under the stream-ofcommerce test. Four Justices (Justices Brennan, et al.) said that
placing a product in the stream was itself sufficient to establish
purposeful availment, as long as the defendant had been aware that
the final product was being marketed in the forum state as part of the
“regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to
distribution to retail sale.”61 Four other Justices (Justices O’Connor,
et al.) insisted that a more “substantial connection” was required, i.e.,
some additional “action of the defendant purposely directed toward
the forum State,” such as advertising or soliciting sales in the forum
state; establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers
in the forum state; or creating, controlling, or employing the
distribution system that brought its products into the forum state.62
The ninth Justice (Justice Stevens) declined to endorse either
approach but emphasized the importance of taking the volume,
value, and hazardous nature of the product into account, and on that
basis he suggested that purposeful availment had been satisfied.63
Asahi was decided in 1987, and for the next twenty-four years
the Court offered no clarification of the stream-of-commerce theory.
As a consequence, state courts and lower federal courts grappled
with the conflicting messages emanating from the Asahi stream-ofcommerce opinions; some adopted Justice Brennan’s “pure” streamof-commerce model, some adopted Justice O’Connor’s “something
more” or “plus” stream-of-commerce model, and others adopted a
hybrid approach that depended on whether the product at issue was a
finished product or a component part. There were also a lot of
nuances in between each of the chosen approaches.64 In short, when
McIntyre UK filed its motion to dismiss before the New Jersey trial
court, the doctrinal scope of the stream-of-commerce theory was
unsettled and had been in that state for just shy of a quarter of a
century.

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 116–21 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 108–13 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See IDES & MAY, supra note 54, at 129.
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IV. THE PROCEEDINGS
IN STATE COURT
As noted above, after being served, McIntyre UK filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.65 The trial court initially
granted the motion, but the Appellate Division of the New Jersey
Superior Court reversed and remanded the case to allow for
jurisdictional discovery.66 After the completion of that discovery,
McIntyre UK renewed its motion to dismiss, which the trial court
again granted, finding that the defendant “does not have a single
contact with New Jersey short of the machine in question ending up
in this state.”67 Moreover, the trial court explained, the defendant
“had no knowledge of the business dealings between [McIntyre
America] and its customers, including Curcio, concerning the atissue shear.”68 The trial court further found “no evidence here
establishing that the defendant had any expectation that its product
would be purchased and utilized in New Jersey.”69
The appellate court again reversed.70 The court issued a lengthy
opinion that provided a detailed account of the facts, a survey of the
law of jurisdiction—with a specific focus on the stream-ofcommerce theory, including an application of Justice O’Connor’s
something-more standard—and concluded that McIntyre UK was
subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey.71 The essence of the
appellate court’s reasoning is captured in the following passage:
Defendant designated McIntyre America as its
exclusive distributor for the entire United States. Therefore,
anyone in any state that wished to purchase one of
defendant’s machines was required to purchase it from
McIntyre America, defendant’s exclusive sales agent in this
country. This was not a temporary or fleeting arrangement.
From at least as early as 1995, when Curcio purchased the
machine, until its bankruptcy in 2001, McIntyre America
enjoyed this relationship with defendant on an ongoing
65. Nicastro I, 945 A.2d 92, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J.
2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
66. Id. at 99 n.1.
67. Id. at 99.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 95.
71. See id. at 99–109.
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basis. The relationship was established by defendant for the
purpose of selling its machines in all fifty states. The
machines were designed to conform with United States
standards as well as those in the United Kingdom. McIntyre
America traded on defendant’s name and held itself out as
“America’s Link to Quality Metal Processing Equipment.”
....
Defendant was well aware that McIntyre America was
not the end user of the many machines it sold to McIntyre
America over the years. By definition, McIntyre America
was defendant’s distributor and its function was to resell the
machines to end users. These are large, potentially
dangerous, industrial machines, designed for a limited
market of users engaged in the metal recycling industry.
The machines are designed for use in a stationary location
in an industrial setting. Thus, it would reasonably be
anticipated by defendant and McIntyre America that upon
sale to the end user, the machine would remain at its
location for use by workers there.
When defendant sold and shipped machines to
McIntyre America in Ohio, defendant did not do so with the
purpose of availing itself of the Ohio market. When
defendant’s senior management personnel attended trade
conventions in Las Vegas and other United States cities to
display its machines and seek buyers for them (through
McIntyre America), its purpose was not to sell machines for
use in Las Vegas or those other cities. Defendant was
engaged in purposeful conduct to avail itself of the entire
United States market, namely to effect sales, through its
exclusive distributor, to end users in all fifty states,
including New Jersey.
The sale of the machine to Curcio was not the result of
conduct by a party unrelated to defendant and it was not an
isolated transaction. It was the result of the very distribution
scheme purposefully established by defendant for the sale
of its machines to potential customers located anywhere
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within the exclusive sales territory of McIntyre America.
That territory included New Jersey.72
McIntyre UK appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.73
The New Jersey Supreme Court began its opinion with a long—
very long—windup that included a description of the facts; the
proceedings, including the Appellate Division of the New Jersey
Superior Court’s opinion; the arguments by the parties and a
participating amicus; and a history lesson on the development of the
law of jurisdiction, both nationally and in New Jersey, with a specific
discussion of stream-of-commerce theory, including Justice
O’Connor’s something-more standard.74 As to the something-more
standard, the opinion noted that several courts had interpreted Justice
O’Connor’s standard as having been satisfied in the context of
foreign manufacturers that employed national marketing schemes
resulting in sales and injuries in the forum state.75 The state high
court then pitched the following stream-of-commerce standard down
the middle of the plate:
A foreign manufacturer will be subject to this State’s
jurisdiction if it knows or reasonably should know that
through its distribution scheme its products are being sold
in New Jersey. A manufacturer that knows or reasonably
should know that its products are distributed through a
nationwide distribution system that might lead to those
products being sold in any of the fifty states must expect
that it will be subject to this State’s jurisdiction if one of its
defective products is sold to a New Jersey consumer,
causing injury. The focus is not on the manufacturer’s
control of the distribution scheme, but rather on the
manufacturer’s knowledge of the distribution scheme
through which it is receiving economic benefits in each
state where its products are sold.76
The court found that the standard was satisfied under the facts
presented:

72. Id. at 104–05.
73. Nicastro II, 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
74. Id. at 577–92.
75. Id. at 589–90.
76. Id. at 591–92 (citations omitted).
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[W]e find that the record supports the exercise of
jurisdiction over J. McIntyre under the stream-of-commerce
doctrine. J. McIntyre, a company incorporated in the United
Kingdom, targeted the United States market for the sale of
its recycling products. It did so by engaging McIntyre
America, an Ohio-based company, as its exclusive United
States distributor for an approximately seven-year period
ending in 2001. J. McIntyre knew or reasonably should
have known that the distribution system extended to the
entire United States, because its company officials, along
with McIntyre America officials, attended scrap metal trade
shows and conventions in various American cities where its
products were advertised. Indeed, J. McIntyre’s president
was present at the Las Vegas trade convention where his
exclusive distributor introduced plaintiff’s employer to the
allegedly defective McIntyre Model 640 Shear that severed
four of plaintiff’s fingers.
It is clear that those attending the scrap metal trade
shows and conventions came from areas other than the
cities hosting those events, and that the joint appearances by
J. McIntyre and McIntyre America were calculated efforts
to penetrate the overall American market. Plaintiff’s
employer, a New Jersey businessman, is just one example
of a person who traveled thousands of miles to a convention
where, by dint of a sales effort, he purchased one of
J. McIntyre’s machines. J. McIntyre may not have had
access to McIntyre America’s customer list, but J. McIntyre
knew or reasonably should have known that its machines
were being sold in states other than Ohio and in cities other
than where the trade conventions were held. J. McIntyre
may not have known the precise destination of a purchased
machine, but it clearly knew or should have known that the
products were intended for sale and distribution to
customers located anywhere in the United States.77
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.78

77. Id. at 592–93.
78. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010).
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V. THE OPINIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
A. The Plurality
Justice Kennedy authored a plurality opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court reversing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
decision.79 The Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined
the opinion.80 Justice Kennedy’s opinion disappoints on a number of
levels, the most important of which is that it utterly fails to clarify the
doctrinal standards. It will also disappoint anyone who expects the
Supreme Court Justices to take language seriously, to interpret
precedents fairly, or to explain in cogent terms why the applicable
law demands a particular outcome.
1. Minor Flaws: Doctrinal Indifference
Part II of the plurality opinion begins with a four-paragraph
mini-survey of the law of personal jurisdiction. The survey gets some
things right, gets some things wrong, and leaves much unsaid. From
one point of view, minor “flaws” in the introductory passages of a
Supreme Court opinion are of little import and easily ignored. But
details do matter (at least that’s what I teach my students), and when
an opinion begins its foray into the law with a careless exposition of
the underlying doctrine, at a minimum one loses confidence in the
Justice’s ability to reason through the case’s more critical aspects.
And all too often today’s minor flaw becomes tomorrow’s new
doctrine. So even if such peccadilloes do not poison the well of
reasoning, they should serve as a warning to anyone who is about to
draw the water.
The first two paragraphs of Part II are unremarkable. They
reaffirm the threshold minimum-contacts standard of purposeful
availment and make it clear that this standard applies in products
liability cases.81 Regardless of what one may think the law of

79. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality opinion).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2786–87.
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jurisdiction ought to be, the plurality correctly states what the law is
and has been for some time.82
The next two paragraphs are a bit more problematic. In the first
of these, the plurality describes three traditional ways in which “[a]
person may submit to a State’s [jurisdictional] authority”: “explicit”
consent, presence, and domicile.83 As the plurality explains it,
“These examples support exercise of the general jurisdiction of the
State’s courts and allow the State to resolve both matters that
originate within the State and those based on activities and events
elsewhere.”84 That is not entirely correct. While presence and
domicile will validate the exercise of general jurisdiction, explicit
consent is significantly less likely to do so. For example, most
explicit-consent forum selection clauses include an “arise out of” or
“relates to” requirement85 and do not, therefore, subject a party who
is bound by the clause to general jurisdiction in the selected forum. I
doubt that the plurality intended to signal a change in the law of
forum selection clauses. So we can count this as an example of
confident carelessness. Note as well that the plurality makes no
mention of a fourth traditional basis for asserting jurisdiction,

82. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The plurality does, however, make
one odd observation toward the end of the second paragraph in Part II. “[I]n some cases,” says the
plurality, “as with an intentional tort, the defendant might well fall within the State’s authority by
reason of his attempt to obstruct its laws.” J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (plurality opinion). The
plurality cites no authority for this somewhat ambiguous and extraneous proposition. On the one
hand, the proposition appears sound to the extent that it describes a sufficient condition for the
assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose extraterritorial tortious act causes a
foreseeable effect (obstruction of the laws) in the forum state. This would be a special instance of
the effects test established in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). On the other hand, the
plurality’s proposition, which is stated as an exception to a general principle of purposeful
availment, can be interpreted to mean that “obstruction” is a necessary component of the effects
test. If this is the intended sense of the quoted language, the proposition represents a significant
narrowing of the standard established by a unanimous Court in Calder—a standard that focuses
on the focal point of the harm and not in any fashion on a concept of obstruction. Id. at 789–90.
Why describe a narrow instance of a particular jurisdictional standard without referencing the
standard, if not to narrow that standard to the particularized instance? Or is the proposition
nothing more than a chatty and somewhat careless statement signifying nothing about the
overarching standard? Or does the author actually know what the standard is?
83. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (plurality opinion).
84. Id.
85. See Maxwell J. Wright, Enforcing Forum-Selection Clauses: An Examination of the
Current Disarray of Federal Forum-Selection Clause Jurisprudence and a Proposal for Judicial
Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1625, 1627 (2011) (“A forum-selection clause is a contract
provision under which the parties agree to file any suit arising under their contract in a specified
forum.” (emphasis added)).
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voluntary appearance, which could be seen as a form of consent but
not necessarily explicit consent.
The next paragraph describes specific jurisdiction as “a more
limited form of submission to a State’s authority.”86 In the plurality’s
words, “[S]ubmission through contact with and activity directed at a
sovereign may justify specific jurisdiction ‘in a suit arising out of or
related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’”87 This is correct,
though one might quibble with the “submission” characterization,
but we will want to see what the plurality means by “activity directed
at a sovereign.” Hint: we won’t be told.
Overall, with respect to these latter two paragraphs, the
plurality’s attempt to define the line between general jurisdiction and
specific jurisdiction as being a demarcation between an incomplete
list of traditional forms of jurisdiction (explicit consent, presence,
and domicile) and contacts-premised jurisdiction is both artificial and
incomplete. I have already mentioned the absence of voluntary
appearance as a traditional form of jurisdictional submission to the
sovereign. Like consent, a voluntary appearance can trigger either
general or specific jurisdiction depending on the nature of the case in
which the voluntary appearance is made. In addition, general
jurisdiction is not limited to the traditional bases of jurisdiction but
can be based on the substantiality of the nonresident defendant’s
purposeful contacts with the forum state.88 Perhaps the plurality
would say that, in the latter circumstance, the nonresident defendant
is “present” in the state, signaling a return to the “fiction” approach
to jurisdiction abandoned in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.89
In any event, a reader seeking a basic understanding of the law of
personal jurisdiction would be sorely misled by the plurality’s
exegesis.
In short, the plurality’s discussion of the foundational legal
standards is imprecise, incomplete, and at points mistaken. None of
this matters much, except that it leaves the reader with a sense that

86. Id.
87. Id. at 2788 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
n.414 (1984)).
88. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011).
Notably, Goodyear Dunlop was decided the same day as J. McIntyre and, being a unanimous
decision, was joined by each member of the plurality. Id. at 2846, 2850.
89. 326 U.S. 310, 316–19 (1945).
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the plurality has either a muddled view of the background principles
or simply does not care enough about them.
2. Not-So-Minor Flaw: Interpretive Laxity
Having set a purposeful-availment foundation afloat in murky
waters, the plurality next focuses on what it characterizes as the
stream-of-commerce metaphor. Here the plurality correctly observes
that this metaphor (or theory, test, or doctrine) was never meant to
“amend the general rule of personal jurisdiction.”90 In the plurality’s
words, the stream-of-commerce metaphor “merely observes that a
defendant may in an appropriate case be subject to jurisdiction
without entering the forum—itself an unexceptional proposition—as
where manufacturers or distributors ‘seek to serve’ a given State’s
market.”91 In other words, stream-of-commerce analysis is not a
substitute for purposeful availment but a method through which to
determine whether the purposeful-availment standard has been
satisfied. So far, so good. But now the plurality leaps from the
analytical utility of the metaphor to a fixed definition of it: “The
defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction
only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum.”92
Perhaps the plurality is invoking Justice O’Connor’s something-more
or stream-of-commerce-plus model. Or, on the theory that new
words may signify a new direction, it could be that the plurality is
endorsing a new and stricter standard. We’ll return to this “target”
metaphor momentarily.
The plurality saw its mission as presenting “an opportunity to
provide greater clarity”93 to the “decades-old questions left open in
Asahi.”94 One would expect, then, a careful exegesis of the Asahi
opinions and their unsettled aftermath. Oddly enough, the plurality’s
discussion of Asahi and lower courts’ efforts to apply that case is
remarkably brief. The bulk of it consists of three paragraphs:
In Asahi, an opinion by Justice Brennan for four
Justices outlined a different approach. It discarded the
central concept of sovereign authority in favor of
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (plurality opinion).
Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 2786.
Id. at 2785.
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considerations of fairness and foreseeability. As that
concurrence contended, “jurisdiction premised on the
placement of a product into the stream of commerce
[without more] is consistent with the Due Process Clause,”
for “[a]s long as a participant in this process is aware that
the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the
possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.” It
was the premise of the concurring opinion that the
defendant’s ability to anticipate suit renders the assertion of
jurisdiction fair. In this way, the opinion made
foreseeability the touchstone of jurisdiction.
The standard set forth in Justice Brennan’s concurrence
was rejected in an opinion written by Justice O’Connor; but
the relevant part of that opinion, too, commanded the assent
of only four Justices, not a majority of the Court. That
opinion stated: “The ‘substantial connection’ between the
defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of
minimum contacts must come about by an action of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State.”
Since Asahi was decided, the courts have sought to
reconcile the competing opinions. But Justice Brennan’s
concurrence, advocating a rule based on general notions of
fairness and foreseeability, is inconsistent with the premises
of lawful judicial power. This Court’s precedents make
clear that it is the defendant’s actions, not his expectations,
that empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment.95
Let’s begin by examining what Justice Brennan actually said in
Asahi. He began his Asahi opinion with this sentence, “I do not agree
with [Justice O’Connor’s] interpretation . . . of the stream-ofcommerce theory, nor with the conclusion that Asahi did not
‘purposefully avail itself of the California market.’”96 He then
explained his theory as follows:

95. Id. at 2788–89 (citations omitted).
96. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
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The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable
currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of
products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale. As
long as a participant in this process is aware that the final
product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility
of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise. Nor will the
litigation present a burden for which there is no
corresponding benefit. A defendant who has placed goods
in the stream of commerce benefits economically from the
retail sale of the final product in the forum State, and
indirectly benefits from the State’s laws that regulate and
facilitate commercial activity. These benefits accrue
regardless of whether that participant directly conducts
business in the forum State, or engages in additional
conduct directed toward that State. Accordingly, most
courts and commentators have found that jurisdiction
premised on the placement of a product into the stream of
commerce is consistent with the Due Process Clause, and
have not required a showing of additional conduct.97
After this introductory discussion, Brennan provided a detailed
account of the Court’s decision in World-Wide Volkswagen, and
quoted, with approval, the following passages from that opinion:
[T]his is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly
irrelevant. But the foreseeability that is critical to due
process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product
will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the
defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into Court there. . . .
. . . Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or
distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an
isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the
manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly,
the market for its product in other States, it is not
unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its
allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source
of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does not
97. Id. at 117.
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exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State.98
Brennan ended his Asahi opinion by explaining why, in his
view, “the facts found by the California Supreme Court support its
finding of minimum contacts.”99 Here he focused on “Asahi’s regular
and extensive sales of component parts to a manufacturer it knew
was making regular sales of the final product in California.”100
One could certainly disagree with Justice Brennan’s application
of the purposeful-availment standard in Asahi, though a majority of
the Asahi Court apparently did not.101 But whatever one might say
about his Asahi opinion, a description of it as endorsing a “fairness
and forseeability” theory or as premised on “general fairness”
principles is not even marginally credible.102 Among other things,
Justice Brennan only alluded to fairness once in his stream-ofcommerce discussion, and then only in reference to the contactspremised rationale of the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen.103
Instead of “fairness,” the clear focus of Brennan’s Asahi opinion was
on what he thought constitutes purposeful availment.
As to foreseeability, Brennan did endorse the foreseeability-ofbeing-haled-into-court-standard, but that standard is premised on the
nonresident’s contacts with the forum state, for it is the purposeful
contacts with the forum that lead to the foreseeability of being sued
98. Id. at 119–20 (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 121.
101. Three members of the Court (Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) joined Justice
Brennan’s plurality, and Justice Stevens, writing separately, seemed to agree:
In most circumstances I would be inclined to conclude that a regular course of dealing
that results in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several years
would constitute “purposeful availment” even though the item delivered to the forum
State was a standard product marketed throughout the world.
Id. at 122. Notably, Justices White and Blackmun joined this opinion, suggesting a strong
commonality between the Brennan and Stevens models. Id. at 121.
102. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788–89 (2011) (plurality opinion).
103. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 119 (“The [World-Wide Volkswagen] Court reasoned that when a
corporation may reasonably anticipate litigation in a particular forum, it cannot claim that such
litigation is unjust or unfair, because it ‘can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by
procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to consumers, or, if the risks are too great,
severing its connection with the State.’” (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980))).
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there. Moreover, Brennan’s acceptance of that version of
foreseeability was hardly noteworthy since the Court had endorsed
precisely that standard in both World-Wide Volkswagen104 and
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.105 But more to the point, Brennan’s
Asahi opinion affirmatively rejected the more generalized approach
to foreseeability that the plurality had accused him of adopting:
“[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum
State.”106 And lest there be any doubt, in Burger King, decided two
years before Asahi, Brennan had authored the opinion for the Court
and in that opinion specifically rejected the generalized approach to
foreseeability as not providing a “sufficient benchmark” for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.107
Whatever stream-of-commerce metaphor the plurality would
like to endorse, the road to that metaphor should not be paved with
such an obvious interpretive gaffe.
Equally flawed, but for a different reason, is the plurality’s
“interpretation” of Justice O’Connor’s Asahi opinion. In essence, the
plurality offers no interpretation. Aside from quoting O’Connor’s
“something more” admonition,108 the plurality makes no effort to
examine the O’Connor version of stream of commerce, either in the
abstract or in practical application. In fact, the plurality’s only other
allusion to O’Connor’s opinion is the following: “The conclusion
that the authority to subject a defendant to judgment depends on
purposeful availment, consistent with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in
Asahi, does not by itself resolve many difficult questions of
104. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
105. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). “[T]he constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant
purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum state . . . . ‘[T]he foreseeability that is
critical to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court here.’” Id. at 474
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
106. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 119 (emphasis added) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
297).
107. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. Prior to the decision in Burger King, Justice Brennan had
endorsed the foreseeability-of-injury-in-the-forum standard. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 226 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). But in his Burger King majority opinion, Justice
Brennan abandoned that endorsement, describing his previous position as having been
“consistently” rejected by the Court. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 n.16. Nothing in Brennan’s
Asahi opinion even hints at a return to his previously held views. Indeed, that opinion reiterates
Brennan’s acceptance of the haled-into-court standard. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 119.
108. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792 (2011) (plurality opinion).
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jurisdiction that will arise in particular cases.”109 Of course this is
true. No doctrinal standard (aside from an absolutist one) can solve
all the difficult, fact-based questions that arise under the standard.
But, given the plurality’s mission of clarification, one would expect a
relatively careful examination of the something-more option.
Here is what Justice O’Connor had to say about her proposed
standard, followed by her application of that standard to the Asahi
facts:
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State. Additional conduct of the
defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the
market in the forum State, for example, designing the
product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the
forum State, establishing channels for providing regular
advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the
product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the
sales agent in the forum State. But a defendant’s awareness
that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product
into the forum State does not convert the mere act of
placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully
directed toward the forum State.
Assuming, arguendo, that respondents have established
Asahi’s awareness that some of the valves sold to Cheng
Shin would be incorporated into tire tubes sold in
California, respondents have not demonstrated any action
by Asahi to purposefully avail itself of the California
market. Asahi does not do business in California. It has no
office, agents, employees, or property in California. It does
not advertise or otherwise solicit business in California. It
did not create, control, or employ the distribution system
that brought its valves to California. There is no evidence
that Asahi designed its product in anticipation of sales in
California. On the basis of these facts, the exertion of
personal jurisdiction over Asahi by the Superior Court of
California exceeds the limits of due process.110
109. Id. at 2790.
110. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112–13 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).

Winter 2012]

FOREWORD

367

We can see from this passage that there is a clear distinction
between the O’Connor and Brennan approaches. Both demand
purposeful availment, but O’Connor insists on additional forumdirected contacts beyond the nonresident defendant’s participation in
the regular and anticipated flow of the commercial stream into the
forum state. And she provides a nonexclusive list of possibilities to
elucidate what she believes would satisfy her standard. Further,
O’Connor explains why she thinks this “something more” was
lacking in Asahi since the nonresident defendant there had done
nothing affirmative to promote sales of its product in California.
Among other things, the Japanese manufacturer “did not create,
control, or employ the distribution system that brought its valves to
California.”111 True, Justice O’Connor’s approach does not provide a
litmus-test solution to the question of purposeful availment, but both
her description of the factors she considered relevant and her
application of those factors did help to “clarify the contours of [the]
principle,”112 to borrow the J. McIntyre plurality’s description of the
ultimate goal of the case-by-case lawmaking method.
The plurality’s “clarification” of the Asahi opinions thus takes
us nowhere. The mischaracterization of Justice Brennan’s approach
as a fairness-and-foreseeability model is a complete non-starter. It
seems to be premised on the notion that words don’t matter, that
interpretation is a type of freestyle wrestling match with no holds
barred. And the plurality’s failure to examine the “contours” of
Justice O’Connor’s something-more model leaves the reader without
any hold whatsoever. Justice O’Connor’s invitation to engage in a
fact-based examination of the question of purposeful availment is
treated as nothing more than a generalized, free-floating doctrine,
unworthy of careful examination or application.
The plurality ends Part II with platitudes about sovereignty and
the “genius” of our constitutional system and with a promise that
“judicial exposition will, in common-law fashion, clarify the
contours of [the purposeful-availment] principle.”113 But we’re
already off to a fairly bleak start.

111. Id. at 112.
112. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (plurality opinion).
113. Id.
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3. Major Flaws: Concepts over Facts
One of the notable features of the plurality opinion is its
minimalist and somewhat loaded description of the facts. Part I of the
opinion purports to describe the “three primary facts” that the
plaintiffs’ counsel stressed, but the description is more argumentative
than descriptive and leans heavily toward the defendant’s version of
those facts:
First, an independent company agreed to sell
J. McIntyre’s machines in the United States. J. McIntyre
itself did not sell its machines to buyers in this country
beyond the U.S. distributor, and there is no allegation that
the distributor was under J. McIntyre’s control.
Second, J. McIntyre officials attended annual
conventions for the scrap recycling industry to advertise
J. McIntyre’s machines alongside the distributor. The
conventions took place in various States, but never in New
Jersey.
Third, no more than four machines . . . , including the
machine that caused the injuries that are the basis for this
suit, ended up in New Jersey.
In addition to these facts emphasized by respondent,
the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that J. McIntyre held
both United States and European patents on its recycling
technology. It also noted that the U.S. distributor
“structured [its] advertising and sales efforts in accordance
with” J. McIntyre’s “direction and guidance whenever
possible,” and that “at least some of the machines were sold
on consignment to” the distributor.114
The plurality returns to these facts in Part III of its opinion, in
which it purports to apply its “target” standard of purposeful
availment. Supposedly, this is the “exposition” that will “clarify” the
key legal principles by focusing on the “defendant’s conduct and the
economic realities of the market the defendant seeks to serve . . . .”115
Here is that promised exposition in total:
Respondent has not established that J. McIntyre
engaged in conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey.
114. Id. at 2786 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 2790.
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Recall that respondent’s claim of jurisdiction centers on
three facts: The distributor agreed to sell J. McIntyre’s
machines in the United States; J. McIntyre officials
attended trade shows in several States but not in New
Jersey; and up to four machines ended up in New Jersey.
The British manufacturer had no office in New Jersey; it
neither paid taxes nor owned property there; and it neither
advertised in, nor sent any employees to, the State. Indeed,
after discovery the trial court found that the “defendant does
not have a single contact with New Jersey short of the
machine in question ending up in this state.” These facts
may reveal an intent to serve the U.S. market, but they do
not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the
New Jersey market.116
Quite obviously, there is no analysis here. This is a restatement
of the facts at a broad level of generality, followed by a conclusion.
The most we can say is that the target standard has not been satisfied,
but why that is the case is difficult to ascertain.
Suppose the plurality had written a competent opinion that
accurately described the differences between the Brennan and
O’Connor stream-of-commerce theories, then explained why it
preferred one over the other, then followed that with a detailed
application of the chosen theory. Let’s assume that the O’Connor
model was deemed the more suitable. A competent (not brilliant, just
competent) opinion applying that theory would note that McIntyre
UK did not design its Model 640 Shear specifically for the New
Jersey market, nor did the company market or advertise its products
within New Jersey (other than through ads in trade magazines that
were distributed nationally). On the other hand, our careful
application of the O’Connor theory would note that McIntyre UK
did, at least arguably, establish a channel for providing advice and
customer support by affixing the manufacturer’s name, address, and
telephone number to its machines sold in the United States. More
importantly, Justice O’Connor’s emphasis on the distribution system
would, at a minimum, require us to ask whether McIntyre UK had
created, controlled, or employed the distribution system that brought
the Model 640 Shear into New Jersey. (More on this later.)
116. Id. (citation omitted).
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Regardless of what one might conclude from such an analysis,
the exposition would clarify the principle being applied. Of course,
by treating the case as presenting an abstract question pertaining to
“submission to sovereignty,”117 the plurality avoids the difficult
questions and succeeds only at making the law less clear than it was
before Justice Kennedy (or his clerks) took pen in hand.
In the end, we’d like to know precisely what standard the
plurality has adopted. We know that it is not a fairness-andforeseeability model; we can presume that it is not Justice Brennan’s
regular-and-anticipated-flow model (although the plurality never
actually confronts that model); and we now must doubt that it is
O’Connor’s something-more model, since the plurality rather
assiduously avoids asking the questions demanded by that model.
Perhaps we can describe the target model as some form of
“plus/plus” under which the nonresident defendant must aim its
arrow precisely at the bull’s-eye of the forum state. For it is
apparently the case, from the plurality’s perspective, that if the
nonresident defendant uses a scattershot weapon with a wider range
and aims at the states more generally, the fact that any particular
state finds itself on the receiving end will be of no avail.
B. The Concurrence
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, concurred in the
judgment reversing the New Jersey Supreme Court.118 Don’t look for
satisfaction here. Justice Breyer’s opinion reads like a casual tête-àtête. Think tea and biscuits. As he sees it, the case is just too easy.
Given the unremarkable facts, which have no bearing on “recent
changes in commerce and communication,” and the established
precedent, which requires no elaboration, there is no apparent reason
to tarry with the details or the consequences.119
1. Outcome Determined by Precedents
The concurrence relies on the same “three primary facts” as the
plurality (albeit worded somewhat differently):120

117. See id. at 2787.
118. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
119. Id.
120. Compare id. at 2786 (plurality opinion) (“three primary facts”), with id. at 2791 (Breyer,
J., concurring) (“three primary facts”).

Winter 2012]

FOREWORD

371

(1) The American Distributor on one occasion sold and
shipped one machine to a New Jersey customer, namely,
Mr. Nicastro’s employer, Mr. Curcio; (2) the British
Manufacturer permitted, indeed wanted, its independent
American Distributor to sell its machines to anyone in
America willing to buy them; and (3) representatives of the
British Manufacturer attended trade shows in “such cities as
Chicago, Las Vegas, New Orleans, Orlando, San Diego,
and San Francisco.”121
Consider the word choice: “on one occasion . . . permitted,
indeed wanted . . . attended trade shows . . . .” Gosh. One senses
McIntyre UK pining for a sale somewhere, anywhere in America,
wandering from trade show to trade show, hoping on hope for just a
little luck. Dr. Watson might have called it, “The Curious Case of the
Wistful Manufacturer.” Well it is a clever and useful technique.
Essentially, Justice Breyer reduces the narrative to the fortuitous and
inconsequential sale of a widget machine. Coincidentally, that
reduction fits perfectly with the concurrence’s fabricated (as we will
see) version of the applicable doctrine. Thus, the concurrence
instructs the reader that none of the Court’s “precedents finds that a
single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort
indicated here [‘permitted, indeed wanted’], is sufficient. Rather, this
Court’s previous holdings suggest the contrary.”122 Of course, if
Justice Breyer had been out for a stroll instead of chatting in his
parlor, he might have tripped over McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co.,123 the classic single-solicitation case. (Think of
McGee as a case in which a nonresident defendant targeted one
solicitation at a forum resident.)
For his holdings-suggest-to-the-contrary thesis (note his use of
the plural), Justice Breyer cites one (and only one) case—WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. He describes that case (in full)
as follows: “The Court has held that a single sale to a customer who
takes an accident-causing product to a different State (where the
accident takes place) is not a sufficient basis for asserting

121. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Nicastro II, 987 A.2d 575, 578–79 (N.J.
2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011)).
122. Id. at 2792 (emphasis added).
123. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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jurisdiction.”124 Anywhere? Not even in the state of retail sale? If we
add the phrase “in the state in which that accident occurred” to the
end of the foregoing quotation, the sentence becomes descriptively
accurate, but remains somewhat misleading in the present context.
The holding in World-Wide Volkswagen instead turned on how the
product reached the forum state.
One might have thought that the more relevant aspect of the
World-Wide Volkswagen decision was the Court’s endorsement of
the stream-of-commerce theory: “The forum State does not exceed
its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased
by consumers in the forum State.”125 But no. Somehow
(unexplained), the concurrence wrings from World-Wide Volkswagen
an aspersion on the jurisdictional sufficiency of a single sale in the
forum state, regardless of how that sale came about.
The only other support Breyer offers for his single-saleinsufficiency thesis is in reference to the plurality and concurring
opinions in Asahi:
And the Court, in separate opinions [in Asahi], has strongly
suggested that a single sale of a product in a State does not
constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over
an out-of-state defendant, even if that defendant places his
goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and hoping)
that such a sale will take place.126
(Again with the wistful manufacturer.) Here is his unexpurgated
defense of that assertion:
See Asahi Metal Industry Co. . . . (opinion of O’Connor, J.)
(requiring “something more” than simply placing “a
product into the stream of commerce,” even if defendant is
“awar[e]” that the stream “may or will sweep the product
into the forum State”); (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (jurisdiction should lie where a
sale in a State is part of “the regular and anticipated flow”
of commerce into the State, but not where that sale is only

124. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
125. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980).
126. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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an “edd[y],” i.e., an isolated occurrence); (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (indicating
that “the volume, the value, and the hazardous character” of
a good may affect the jurisdictional inquiry and
emphasizing Asahi’s “regular course of dealing”).127
A quick read of the foregoing quotation might lead one to
conclude that Justice Breyer basically gets it right: stream-ofcommerce-plus, stream-of-commerce-pure, and multi-factored
balancing. But keep in mind that these nutshell descriptions are
presented as suggesting a specific doctrinal standard—single-saleinsufficiency—that will reduce this case to a biscuit crumb, easily
brushed off the docket. So a closer look is warranted.
Clearly, Justice O’Connor did endorse a something-more
standard. But her something more had nothing to do with the volume
of sales, single or otherwise. Rather, the entire focus of that standard
was on whether the nonresident defendant had engaged in additional
purposeful conduct directed at the forum state, i.e., conduct beyond
the “placement” and “awareness” elements of the stream-ofcommerce theory:
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent
or purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for
example, designing the product for the market in the forum
State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels
for providing regular advice to customers in the forum
State, or marketing the product through a distributor who
has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.128
As previously noted, in finding that this something-more
standard had not been satisfied in Asahi, Justice O’Connor
specifically pointed out that Asahi “did not create, control, or employ
the distribution system that brought its valves to California.”129

127. Id. (citations omitted).
128. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987).
129. Id. at 112–13. Following the quoted material, Justice O’Connor used a “Cf.” cite to a
district court opinion that upheld jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that had no direct
contacts with the forum state but that used a distributor to market its products throughout the
nation. Hicks v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 452 F. Supp. 130 (M.D. Pa. 1978). Justice O’Connor’s
reference to Hicks may not have been an endorsement of the opinion, but it does suggest her
support of a somewhat more fluid and nuanced approach to the something-more standard than
one might glean from the plurality and concurring opinions in J. McIntyre.
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Thus, Justice O’Connor provided a clear idea of what types of
facts would support a finding of “something more,” none of which
referenced the quantity of the sales. Presumably, a single sale would
do the trick, if that sale were heavily promoted or if the defendant
had employed the distribution system that brought the product into
the state. While this might be unusual in the case of consumer
products (the issue in Asahi), it certainly would not be unusual in a
case involving the sale of heavy, costly industrial machinery (the
issue in J. McIntyre). Justice Breyer never explains how O’Connor’s
qualitative-plus translates into a quantitative-minus. He apparently
assumes that the reader will take the lure. But there is, quite simply,
no logical chain of reasoning that leads from one to the other.130
As to the Brennan standard, while Justice Breyer does not adopt
Justice Kennedy’s fairness-and-foreseeability interpretation of the
Brennan approach, he offers his own form of interpretive surgery.
Here’s Brennan: “The stream of commerce refers not to
unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated
flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale.”131
Here’s Breyer on Brennan: “[J]urisdiction should lie where a sale in
a State is part of ‘the regular and anticipated flow’ of commerce into
the State, but not where that sale is only an ‘edd[y],’ i.e., an isolated
occurrence.”132 For the real Brennan, an “eddy” is something that is
unpredictable; for the Breyer version of Brennan, an “eddy” is an
isolated occurrence.133 These are different things.134 And, most
importantly, an isolated occurrence can be predictable. For example,
the single sale of heavy industrial equipment may well be an isolated
occurrence, but such a sale is not necessarily unpredictable. It is also
worth mentioning that Brennan’s “regular and anticipated flow”
pertains to the “retail sale” of consumer goods and not to the
130. Justice Breyer’s lapse in logic calls to mind to the old Catskills joke, “Boy, the food at
this place is really terrible . . . and such small portions.” ANNIE HALL (United Artists 1977).
131. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
132. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
133. Breyer’s revision of Brennan’s Asahi opinion is much more troubling than Kennedy’s
fairness-and-foreseeability misinterpretation of that same opinion. The Kennedy misinterpretation
has no bearing on the plurality’s endorsement of the target standard. With or without that
misinterpretation, the outcome would be the same. Breyer, on the other hand, uses his revision of
Brennan as the key grounds on which to resolve the case.
134. Webster’s dictionary defines “isolated” as “placed alone or apart: being alone: solitary.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1199 (1993). It defines “unpredictable”
as “not to be foretold.” Id. at 2506.
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marketing and sale of heavy industrial equipment.135 Justice Breyer
simply and simplistically assumes that the language Justice Brennan
used to describe the flow of consumer products is freely transferable
to describe the sale of heavy industrial machinery; and Breyer makes
no effort to justify this beyond-the-context leap. In short, if a singlesale-insufficiency inference is to be drawn from Brennan, it is only
because Breyer has rewritten and decontextualized Brennan’s
standard.
Finally, the concurrence accurately quotes the Stevens balancing
formula (“the volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the
components”136), with the addendum that Stevens “emphasiz[ed]
Asahi’s regular course of dealing.”137 Here’s what Stevens said in
full:
Over the course of its dealings with Cheng Shin, Asahi has
arguably engaged in a higher quantum of conduct than
“[t]he placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more . . . .” Whether or not this conduct rises to the
level of purposeful availment requires a constitutional
determination that is affected by the volume, the value, and
the hazardous character of the components. In most
circumstances I would be inclined to conclude that a regular
course of dealing that results in deliveries of over 100,000
units annually over a period of several years would
constitute “purposeful availment” even though the item
delivered to the forum State was a standard product
marketed throughout the world.138
Nothing in the above quotation suggests that volume operates as
anything other than one of the factors in the determination of
whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. It is
just as plausible to infer that Justice Stevens would uphold
jurisdiction in a case involving the single sale (low volume) of an
expensive (high value) and dangerous (hazardous character) piece of
industrial equipment as it is to infer the opposite. Note as well that

135. Webster’s dictionary defines “retail” as “the sale of commodities or goods in small
quantities to ultimate consumers,” and “retailing” as “the activities involved in the selling goods
to ultimate consumers for personal or household consumption.” Id. at 1938.
136. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring).
137. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
138. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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Stevens was describing his approach to the sale of a “component
part,” not to the sale of a finished product such as the Model 640
Shear. Moreover, Justice Stevens’s reference to Asahi’s “regular
course of dealing” does not introduce an additional element to his
standard but merely (and obviously) describes a sufficient basis for
establishing purposeful availment over Asahi. Breyer, however,
invites the reader to treat the regular-course-of-dealing reference as
imposing a necessary condition on the exercise of jurisdiction. This
is a common LSAT error—mistaking a sufficient condition for a
necessary one—and provides no grounds from which to conclude
that Stevens endorsed or even suggested anything like a single-saleinsufficiency standard.
***
If we add up the nine votes of the Asahi plurality and concurring
opinions (four-four-one), and toss in the seven-person majority
opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen, we arrive at a big zero for
Justice Breyer’s proposed single-sale-insufficiency inference. That
inference is either wholly illogical from the perspective of what the
opinions he relies on actually said, or, to the extent the inference
rests on logic, it flows from reconstructed and recalibrated versions
of those opinions. Keep in mind that this is the inference that makes
the case go away. Thus, Justice Breyer runs his “primary facts”
through the funnel of his ersatz inference and (surprise, surprise)
readily concludes that jurisdiction cannot be sustained under the
present state of the law. In the concurrence’s words, “Accordingly,
on the record present here, resolving this case requires no more than
adhering to our precedents.”139 Yes, but only if adhering to
precedents means revising those precedents to fit the conclusion.
One cannot have confidence in a conclusion derived from such a
factually abstract and intellectually flawed reasoning process. Yet,
while a mistaken path can sometimes lead to the correct destination, I
do not think that is the case here. Although it is not my purpose to
demonstrate that the Court (or the plurality or concurrence) arrived at
an incorrect result, it is instructive to consider how easy it is to
demonstrate that the stream-of-commerce doctrine, as it stood prior
to J. McIntyre, would support a finding of jurisdiction. Taking
Justice O’Connor as our guide—on the assumption that her stream139. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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of-commerce standard is the strictest of the three Asahi standards—
one can reasonably argue that her something-more standard has been
met. Unlike Asahi, a relatively passive component part manufacturer
that didn’t market its products in the United States and that didn’t
employ the distribution system that took its valve from Taiwan to
California, McIntyre UK actively marketed its product in the United
States and did, in fact, choose (“create, control, or employ”140) the
exact distribution system that brought its machine predictably and
not fortuitously to New Jersey. If this argument is wrong, it was
Justice Breyer’s burden to explain why that is so. His abstraction of
the facts and his seeming ignorance of doctrine allows him to duck
that responsibility under the pretense of stare decisis.
2. An Absence of “Modern Concerns”
Part II of Justice Breyer’s concurrence does three things. First, it
expresses disagreement with Justice Kennedy’s “submission” or
target standard, a standard that the concurrence describes as a “strict
no-jurisdiction rule.”141 That disagreement, coupled with Justice
Ginsburg’s implicit rejection of the Kennedy standard in her threeperson dissent, translates into a five-person majority disfavoring the
target standard. Hence, although we don’t know exactly what the
target standard is, we do know that a majority of the Court disfavors
it. We should be thankful for this morsel of clarity.
Second, the concurrence rejects what Justice Breyer
characterizes as the “absolute approach adopted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court . . . .”142 But neither the New Jersey Supreme Court
nor the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court used
the word “absolute” or any derivation of that word. Both state courts
ultimately premised their decisions on a detailed discussion of the
facts connecting McIntyre UK to the marketing and sale of the
Model 640 Shear that was sold to Curcio Scrap Metal in New Jersey.
Justice Breyer premises his absolutist case against the New
Jersey Supreme Court on what seems to be a calculated misreading
(or a casually sloppy reading) of the state court’s opinion. As Breyer
tells it, the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold a manufacturer
“subject to jurisdiction for a products-liability action so long as it
140. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (plurality opinion).
141. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
142. Id.
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‘knows or reasonably should know that its products are distributed
through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to those
products being sold in any of the fifty states.’”143 That’s Justice
Breyer’s emphasis. He’s right. “Might” is a thin reed from which to
hang the assertion of jurisdiction, but the New Jersey Supreme Court
did no such thing. Justice Breyer simply deletes the second half of
the above quoted sentence (without ellipses). Here’s what the New
Jersey Supreme Court actually said:
A manufacturer that knows or reasonably should know that
its products are distributed through a nationwide
distribution system that might lead to those products being
sold in any of the fifty states must expect that it will be
subject to this State’s jurisdiction if one of its defective
products is sold to a New Jersey consumer, causing
injury.144
In other words, the premise of the state court’s standard was not
on a possible sale under a national marketing scheme but on an
actual sale in a state within that marketing scheme’s targeted range.
This may or may not be an acceptable standard, but it isn’t premised
on the word “might.” It is premised on the calculated success of the
marketing scheme, as the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in
some detail.145
Interestingly enough, Justice Breyer’s worries over the
consequences of adopting an absolutist rule underscore the
deficiency of his own opinion:
What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer
which specifically seeks, or expects, an equal-sized
distributor to sell its product in a distant State might seem
unfair in the case of a small manufacturer (say, an
Appalachian potter) who sells his product (cups and
saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who resells a
single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State
(Hawaii).146

143. Id. (quoting Nicastro II, 987 A.2d 575, 592 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011)).
144. Nicastro II, 987 A.2d at 592 (emphasis added).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.
146. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).

Winter 2012]

FOREWORD

379

This faux concern for an imaginary potter encapsulates the
critical flaw in the concurrence, namely, a complete failure to
confront the actual case (facts and law) pending before the Court.
J. McIntyre was not about an Appalachian potter who makes and
peddles consumer products through a large distributor over which the
potter has no apparent control. It was about a well-established
manufacturer of expensive three-ton industrial machines used in the
processing of scrap metal; it was about a manufacturer that directly
employed and participated in a marketing and distribution system
with the express goal of exploiting the entire U.S. market; it was
about a manufacturer that didn’t sit at a potter’s wheel hoping for a
sale somewhere in America but that traveled on an annual basis to
the largest and most relevant marketing conventions held in cities
throughout the United States and that brought its machines there for
display and hawked those machines from booths it shared with its
exclusive U.S. distributor. If one were to conclude that jurisdiction
could be exercised over this manufacturer in those states in which its
marketing scheme met with success, it would not be difficult to
distinguish the case of the “wistful potter.” In any event, let’s worry
about the aggressive manufacturer and marketer actually before the
Court and not about the potter who may (but likely never will) be
asked to defend an injury caused by one of his or her coffee mugs in
Hawaii.147 (Actually, the idea of a retailer in Hawaii selling
Appalachian coffee mugs is pretty amusing. I guess that’s the type of
thing you come up with at tea time.)
Finally, and in partial explanation for his reluctance to adopt
“new” jurisdictional rules in this case, Justice Breyer asserts that
Nicastro’s lawsuit presented “an unsuitable vehicle for making broad
pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules.”148 I believe
that I’ve demonstrated that there was no need to “refashion”
jurisdictional rules to sustain jurisdiction in this case. But even if
some refashioning were required, the premise of the statement is
unsound. Breyer’s point is that the modern phenomenon of Web
147. To be fair to Justice Breyer, he extends his worries beyond Appalachia to Egyptian shirt
makers, Brazilian manufacturing cooperatives, and Kenyan coffee farmers. Id. at 2794. He
worries about them every bit as much as he worries about the potter and the manufacturer of
industrial machines. I do note, however, that all of his worries are directed toward potential
defendants with no parallel concern for the consumers who may be injured by the products sold
into the U.S. market by his imaginary defendants.
148. Id. at 2792–93.

380

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:341

marketing presents the Court with jurisdictional challenges quite
unlike those that arise in quotidian cases such as this one. Apropos of
this concern, he observes:
But what do those standards mean when a company targets
the world by selling products from its Web site? And does it
matter if, instead of shipping the products directly, a
company consigns the products through an intermediary
(say, Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the
orders? And what if the company markets its products
through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed
in a forum? Those issues have serious commercial
consequences but are totally absent in this case.149
Implicit in these observations is that Web marketing differs in
some jurisdictionally relevant fashion from non-Web marketing. But
is that true? Justice Breyer references an imaginary company that
targets the world through its website. He does not explain how that
type of targeting differs in any jurisdictionally significant fashion
from a worldwide marketing scheme that uses non-Web media or
practices to sell its products. For example, there is no doubt that
McIntyre UK targeted the entire U.S. market. If, instead of a
convention-based marketing scheme, McIntyre UK had used the
Web to sell its machines, would the national e-targeting, accessible
in New Jersey, have altered the jurisdictional outcome? Should it?
On what sensible grounds? Would a popup ad appearing on a New
Jersey-accessible website cross the line between unilateral contact
and purposeful contact? Again, Justice Breyer’s conceptual worries
over abstract cases not before the Court leads him to misunderstand
and undervalue the actual case before the Court. He doesn’t seem to
know that he’s comparing apples to apples.150
Here’s where we end up: tea and biscuits served with a
superficial chat about everything except those things that actually
matter—the factual and doctrinal details most pertinent to resolving
the pending case. Personally, I’ve had my fill of tea.
149. Id. at 2793.
150. In Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010), Justice Breyer, writing for a
unanimous Court, adopted a more circumspect approach to cyberspace concerns not before the
Court. In that case, he endorsed a generally applicable standard for measuring a corporation’s
principal place of business, while leaving open the question of how that standard might be applied
in the commercial arrangements of cyberspace. Id. at 1194–95. It is not clear why that sensible
and circumspect approach was not available to him in J. McIntyre.
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C. The Dissent
The dissent, authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan, begins with a dramatic and slightly
Kafkaesque narrative in which an anonymous “foreign industrialist”
simultaneously seeks to develop a market in the United States and
avoid liability in those places in which its marketing succeeds.151
After providing a few details describing the industrialist’s game plan,
the dissent asks, “Has [the industrialist] succeeded in escaping
personal jurisdiction in a State where one of its products is sold and
causes injury or even death to a local user?”152 The reader wants to
say, “Of course not!” But alas, dear reader, the dissent informs,
although the law agrees with you, a “splintered majority” of the
Court does not.153 Rather, that majority has “turn[ed] the clock back”
to a “Pilate-like” jurisprudence under which the foreign industrialist
may wash its hands of the matter.154
Then a jump cut to the facts: “On October 11, 2001, a three-ton
metal shearing machine severed four fingers on Robert Nicastro’s
right hand.”155 By starting with this stark and highly personalized
detail, one that both the plurality and the concurrence ignore, Justice
Ginsburg announces an alternative perspective from which to view
the case, one that is less worried about abstractions or imaginary
defendants and more concerned with the pending case’s realities. She
continues that reality-driven theme with a thorough and detailed
description of the facts, gathering information from the lower court
opinions, the joint appendix, and, to a small extent, materials beyond
the record.156 She ends the narrative with a charged summation:
In sum, McIntyre UK’s regular attendance and
exhibitions at ISRI conventions was surely a purposeful
step to reach customers for its products “anywhere in the
United States.” At least as purposeful was McIntyre UK’s
151. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2795.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2795–97. For a similarly detailed description of the facts, see supra text
accompanying notes 5–33. See also Nicastro II, 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010), rev’d sub nom. J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (describing the facts of the case);
Nicastro I, 945 A.2d 92, 96 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 2010),
rev’d sub nom. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (describing the facts
of the case).
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engagement of McIntyre America as the conduit for sales of
McIntyre UK’s machines to buyers “throughout the United
States.” Given McIntyre UK’s endeavors to reach and profit
from the United States market as a whole, Nicastro’s suit, I
would hold, has been brought in a forum entirely
appropriate for the adjudication of his claim. He alleges that
McIntyre UK’s shear machine was defectively designed or
manufactured and, as a result, caused injury to him at his
workplace. The machine arrived in Nicastro’s New Jersey
workplace not randomly or fortuitously, but as a result of
the U.S. connections and distribution system that McIntyre
UK deliberately arranged.157
And thus the dissent sets the stage for a careful application of
the law as it stood prior to the retrograde transgressions of the
“splintered majority.”158 Now that’s just the ticket.
After disposing of a few preliminary points, Justice Ginsburg
describes the premise of her jurisdictional assessment as follows:
The modern approach to jurisdiction over corporations
and other legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe,
gave prime place to reason and fairness. Is it not fair and
reasonable, given the mode of trading of which this case is
an example, to require the international seller to defend at
the place its products cause injury? Do not litigational
convenience and choice-of-law considerations point in that
direction? On what measure of reason and fairness can it be
considered undue to require McIntyre UK to defend in New
Jersey as an incident of its efforts to develop a market for its
industrial machines anywhere and everywhere in the United
States? Is not the burden on McIntyre UK to defend in New
Jersey fair, i.e., a reasonable cost of transacting business
internationally, in comparison to the burden on Nicastro to
go to Nottingham, England to gain recompense for an injury
157. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In her description of the facts,
Justice Ginsburg notes that as of 2008, New Jersey was by far the largest processor of scrap metal
in the United States. Id. at 2795. This fact, however, post-dates the events relevant to this case
and is not part of the record. I agree with Justice Breyer that such facts should not be a factor in
the jurisdictional inquiry. Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). This fact does not reappear in
Justice Ginsburg’s jurisdictional analysis.
158. Id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The adjective “splintered” is evocative. It suggests
the chaos of scattered splinters and the crippling fragility of having to wear a splint.
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he sustained using McIntyre’s product at his workplace in
Saddle Brook, New Jersey?159
What? Something has gone awry. The dissent opens with a
volley condemning the plurality and concurrence for “turn[ing] the
clock back” to achieve a result “[i]nconceivable” under the regime of
International Shoe.160 But instead of applying the standards of that
regime, Justice Ginsburg revs the clock to fast-forward toward a new
and more highly evolved standard that she later describes as
representing the “full growth” of jurisdictional doctrine.161
And to where do Justice Ginsburg’s rhetorical questions lead?
Clearly, one could answer each of them with the anticipated response
(yes, yes, none, yes) and still fall short of establishing jurisdiction
under the “modern approach to jurisdiction . . . ushered in by
International Shoe.”162 For while International Shoe may have given
“prime place to reason and fairness,”163 that “prime place” was
constructed from precedents, and each of those precedents involved
purposeful activity in or directed toward the forum state.164 Indeed,
under the regime of International Shoe, it is the fact of purposeful
contact with the forum that sustains the presumption of reason and
fairness by providing the defendant with a fair warning of a potential
lawsuit in the forum. And even if International Shoe itself did not
make the interlocking nature of purposeful contacts and the
presumption of reasonableness clear, cases following it did.165 More
to the point, the Court has been unwavering in its rejection of the
center of gravity or choice of law alternatives to purposeful
direction.166 In Hanson v. Denckla, for example, the Court
specifically held that a state “does not acquire [personal] jurisdiction
by being the ‘center of gravity’ of the controversy, or the most
159. Id. at 2800–01.
160. Id. at 2795.
161. Id. at 2804.
162. Id. at 2800.
163. Id.
164. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–19 (1945) (citing cases).
165. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (holding that “the
constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum
contacts’ in the forum state”); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (holding minimum
contacts with the forum state to be a “prerequisite to the exercise of power” over a nonresident
defendant).
166. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)
(rejecting convenience as the touchstone of due process); Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253–54 (rejecting
“center of gravity” and “choice of law” alternatives to minimum contacts).
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convenient location for litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction,
not choice of law.”167
There is nothing inherently wrong with the center-of-gravity
approach. Among other benefits, it simplifies the jurisdictional
inquiry by eliminating artificial complexities pertaining to
purposefulness and by focusing a court’s attention on the
fundamental due process questions of reasonableness and fairness.
And from an academic point of view, Justice Ginsburg writes a
delightfully intellectual opinion. I do question, however, the tactical
choice of abandoning a more prosaic resolution if only as prelude to
her grander themes. Certainly, her invitation to adopt a convenience
model as an opening gambit is not likely (predictably not likely) to
attract a majority of the current Court, and, unfortunately, the
invitation’s prominent placement in her opinion validates the
concurrence’s claim that only a change in the law could sustain
jurisdiction in this case. Thus, by relying exclusively on a giant leap
forward, Justice Ginsburg plays an active role in the Court’s giant
leap backward.
This poor tactical choice is doubly vexing since Justice
Ginsburg quite clearly does not think that jurisdiction is D.O.A.
under the standard minimum contacts test. Tucked into her effort to
press the arc of the law to its full-growth potential, Justice Ginsburg
offers a glimpse of the more prosaic, minimum-contacts resolution of
Nicastro’s case:
McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre America to promote
and sell its machines in the United States, “purposefully
availed itself “ of the United States market nationwide, not
a market in a single State or a discrete collection of States.
McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of the market of all
States in which its products were sold by its exclusive
distributor. “Th[e] ‘purposeful availment’ requirement,”
this Court has explained, simply “ensures that a defendant
will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of
‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.”168

167. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254.
168. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475).
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The emphasized sentence encapsulates the very essence of this
case: a nationwide marketing plan that leads to jurisdiction in those
states in which the plan succeeds. The essential question implicit in
these facts is whether success in the state constitutes purposeful
availment of that state. Justice Ginsburg never addresses that
question. Instead she offers more rhetorical questions. First this: “If
McIntyre UK is answerable in the United States at all, is it not
‘perfectly appropriate to permit the exercise of that jurisdiction . . . at
the place of injury’?”169 And then this: “How could McIntyre UK not
have intended, by its actions targeting a national market, to sell
products in the fourth largest destination for imports among all States
of the United States and the largest scrap metal market?”170 And
finally she finds solace in two lower court opinions that have upheld
jurisdiction under such circumstances, describing the rationale of
those cases as premised on “fundamental fairness.”171 However, both
cited decisions premised the exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign
manufacturer on a fact-specific satisfaction of Justice O’Connor’s
something-more standard,172 not on an open-ended reason-andfairness standard.
In an apparent response to the plurality and concurring opinions,
the dissent provides an accurate and capable description of WorldWide Volkswagen and Asahi, the point being to demonstrate that
neither of these decisions controlled the pending case’s outcome.
Toward the end of that discussion, the dissent distinguishes between
the component part manufacturer in Asahi, which did not seek out
customers in the U.S. market or control distribution to that market,
and McIntyre UK, which clearly did both. From this the dissent
concludes, “To hold that Asahi controls this case would, to put it
bluntly, be dead wrong.”173 Of course, this statement is dead wrong.
The correct statement would be, “To hold that Asahi precludes the
exercise of jurisdiction in this case would, to put it bluntly, be dead
wrong.” Why? Because given the distinction drawn by the dissent, it
appears quite likely that Justice O’Connor’s something-more
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion also includes an Appendix of lower court opinions
favorable to the exercise of jurisdiction under similar circumstances. Id. at 2804–06.
172. Toben v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 543–44 (6th Cir. 1993); A. Uberti &
C. v. Leonardo, 892 P.2d 1354, 1361–62 (Ariz. 1995).
173. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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standard has been satisfied here. Instead of making that affirmative
point, the dissent’s otherwise intelligent discussion of World-Wide
Volkswagen and Asahi skids to a halt at an analytical dead end.
In short, the dissent starts in a scrap metal yard and winds up in
the faculty lounge. High-minded, but shortsighted. And what of
Nicastro’s severed fingers? Well, isn’t that a shame.
VI. CONCLUSION
If we assume that the role of the judiciary is to decide cases
based on a fair assessment of the facts and applicable law, it would
be difficult to conclude anything other than that the J. McIntyre
Court utterly failed at this task. I have detailed the lack of care and
judgment reflected in each of the separate opinions. The resulting
confusion emanating from the Court’s collective failure to articulate
a coherent standard should also be self-evident. But perhaps even
more disappointing than either of the foregoing is the fact that not a
single Justice on the Court offers a factually sound or well-reasoned
alternative to the respective opinions of Justices Kennedy, Breyer,
and Ginsburg. To my way of thinking, the clerks let their Justices
down, the Justices let their colleagues down, and the Court let us all
down.
True, J. McIntyre does not presage the end of the jurisprudential
world. Lower courts will continue to find a way to muddle through
the questions left open in Asahi, questions now burdened with the
unhelpful J. McIntyre overlay. And lawyers will still find a way to
seek compensation for victims of industrial accidents. It is also not
the case that the current Supreme Court is uniformly dysfunctional.
In the context of procedural law, for example, the sensible and
clearly written opinion in Smith v. Bayer,174 decided this same term,
stands in marked contrast to the Court’s performance in J. McIntyre.
But neither is J. McIntyre exceptional in its display of poor judgment
and faulty reasoning.175 No law professor would want any of the
opinions in J. McIntyre to serve as an exemplar of acceptable legal
analysis. Yet, two or more Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
endorsed each of those opinions. That is surely something to be
174. 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
175. In the context of procedural law, two recent and obvious examples of dismal reasoning
come to mind: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), and Republic of the Philippines v.
Pimental, 553 U.S. 851 (2008).
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reckoned with. To what extent is the lack of attention to detail in
J. McIntyre endemic to the Supreme Court’s decision making
process? Do the J. McIntyre opinions reflect the Court’s mode of
reasoning in cases about which the Justices, in the end, are not much
concerned?176 Or shall we conclude that the more competently
executed exemplars of reasoning are just masks for a feckless
jurisprudence of results? And try teaching J. McIntyre without
inducing students to plummet into a pit of cynicism. Not the end of
the world as we know it, but not a portent of good things to come
either.
Of course, there are cases in which there is no possibility of
achieving a consensus or even a bare majority, due either to the
complexity of the issues presented or to the subject matter of the
controversy. As to the latter, the underlying politics of a case may be
so rigidly drawn that one side of the Court simply cannot see or hear
the other. No one rejoices in such cases, but I accept their
inevitability. Nicastro’s case, however, surely did not fall into either
category. It was neither doctrinally complex nor politically charged.
True, the scope of the stream-of-commerce test was in need of
clarification, but that clarification did not require the unwinding of a
Gordian knot or a rigid adherence to any particular interpretive,
political, or moral position. Instead, it required nothing more than a
carefully considered judgment that a majority of the Court could
endorse. That majority might have adopted Justice O’Connor’s
something-more standard and then explained, with clear and careful
reasoning, why that standard was or was not satisfied. A sensible
dissent might have offered an alternative standard but, accepting the
inevitable, could then have explained why “proper application” of
the O’Connor standard required a result contrary to the one the
majority achieved. Such a solution would have decided Nicastro’s
case on its own terms while at the same time providing the kind of
clear exposition of the law that we can rightfully expect and demand
of the Supreme Court in its combined roles of lawmaker and law
interpreter.
God save the United States and this Honorable Court.
176. In such cases, perhaps the better alternative, once the Justices discover their seeming
indifference, would be to dismiss the case on the basis that certiorari was improvidently granted,
rather than going on to issue opinions that only muddy the waters and damage the Justices’
image.
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